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Abstract
In this paper, we examine whether budget-constrained public authorities
are more likely to use a PPP (Public Private Partnership) than traditional
procurement methods. Then, we study the possible mechanisms underlying
this choice. Our empirical test focuse s on France and consists of a two-stage
approach. First, we examine the impact of budget constraints on the use of
PPPs and find a positive relationship. Second, to better delineate the debt
hiding e ect, we exploit the 2011 changes to the ability to underwrite PPP
debts. We find that debt hiding is a relevant, but not a su cient element
to explain budget-constrained governments’ attitudes towards PPP.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, governments’ behaviors and policies have been significantly
a ected by public financial restraints stemming from domestic policies, financial
markets, or regulatory measures. One prominent example is the limits on deficits
and debt imposed by the European Union according to the terms of the 1992 Maas-
tricht Treaty. As a consequence, resources available for pursuit of public invest-
ment strategies have been increasingly rationed, which in turn makes the choice
of an e cient organizational structure crucial for the realization and management
of public investments. In this context, alternatively to the traditional “market-
hierarchy” or the “public-private” dichotomy, 1, hybrid organizational forms such
as Public Private Partnership (hereafter PPP) 2 has grown considerably in re-
cent decades and nowadays account for a significant portion of public investment
(Posner et al. [2009]).
Under budget constraints, however, this organizational choice is subject to
debate and criticism because PPPs are considered more costly than traditional
public funding methods, in terms of both organizational and financial costs (see
Marty and Tran [2014] for a review).This question raises concerns because the
determinants of organizational choice in the public sector are known to be par-
ticularly crucial due to fundamental di erences between public and private ac-
tors’ respective organizational purpose, incentives, and behavior (Mahoney et al.
[2009], Hodge and Greve [2007], Rangan et al. [2006], Zeng and Chen [2003]). In
this stream of literature, the private sector, which represents for-profit organiza-
tions, has a smoother decision-making processes. In contrast, the public sector
experiences more turbulence, interruptions, recycles, and conflict (e.g., Perry and
Rainey [1988], Rainey et al. [1976], Ring and Perry [1985]). Moreover, as sug-
gested by the long-standing theoretical tradition on public choice and the related
emergence of New Public Management approach (hereafter NPM) in public pol-
icy, public managers are not considered to di er from private managers. They
are self-interested and rational decision makers who primarily seek to maximize
their personal utility (Niskanen [1975]). Both types have conflicting incentives
in meeting the responsibilities to manage the organization well and achieve some
private benefits (Ronen and Yaari [2008]).
As a consequence, practitioners often consider the use of PPP under budget
constraints as being to their fiscal advantage (NAO [2011]), PwC [2010]). Indeed,
the 2004 Eurostat decision classifies PPPs as non-governmental according to the
“risks and rewards” criterion (Heald and Georgiou [2011]). Following this guid-
ance, public authorities can account for PPP activities as being o  balance sheet
when the construction risk and at least one of either availability or demand risk
are transferred to the private operator 3. This accounting rule might therefore
1. We refer to public enterprises as the “hierarchy” model, traditional public procurement as
the “market” model, and privatization as the complete private model
2. PPP are contractual agreements allowing involvement of private sector capital and exper-
tise in the realization and management of an asset that will be returned to the public sector
after an adequate period of time (the “bundling” mechanism after Hart [2003a]).
3. The debt corresponding to PPP investment is entered in the public accrual account
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increase incentives in favor of PPPs for reasons other than the to-be-achieved
advantages of this organizational form. This motivation might be even more im-
portant given the recent fiscal constraints on the public sector to reduce public
debt. This trend has been reported not only in the UK, but also in other Euro-
pean countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. 4 As a consequence,
more o cially, a July 2011 report by the UK House of Commons in recommended
limiting the use of PPP (Parliament [2011]).
In the private sector, a similar accounting strategy (but more widespread in
terms of practice) is called earnings management, i.e., a collection of managerial
decisions that results in the true short-term, value-maximizing earnings as known
to management not being reported (Ronen and Yaari [2008]). The motivation
behind the use of this accounting strategy has been widely studied. In general,
scholars find that managers often use this method to window-dress financial state-
ments prior to public securities o erings. This strategy can have the objective of
improving firms’ financial capacity, i.e. which is beneficial for shareholders. At the
same time, it can reflect managers’ self-interested motivations such as increasing
their own compensation and job security, even though such actions might destroy
value and harm shareholders (see Ronen and Yaari [2008], Healy and Wahlen
[1999] for a review).
This question has also largely studied in terms of the public sector. Recently,
Klien and Tran [2014] find that under an environment of high political competi-
tion, where mayors have uncertain futures, they are more likely to choose PPP
instead of traditional procurement to realize public investment in infrastructure.
The authors o er two main explanations of this result. First, mayors might seek
to achieve better projects through PPPs. Second, mayors might seek to manage
earnings, i.e., hide public debt, in order to gain voters support. However, no em-
pirical evidence exists on this topic. Other scholars in the public finance field seem
to agree regarding public managers’ motivation in using budget gimmicks to sat-
isfy general regulatory measures (Buti et al. [2007], Von Hagen and Wol  [2006],
Milesi-Ferretti [2004], Peterson [2003], Bri ault and Fund [1996], Easterly [1999]).
In the public choice field, scholars also find evidence for public managers’ actions
in terms of public policy towards balanced budget requirements. These practices
might be either beneficial to public organizations (Hou [2013]) or opportunistic
(Rose [2006]).
In this article, we aim to explain why the public actors choose PPP when they
face some financial restraints. More specifically, we try to find evidence for man-
agers’ adoption of a PPP strategy only for fiscal circumventing motivations, i.e.,
putting public debt o  the balance sheet. Several studies have found a correlation
between the use of PPPs and financial constraints (see Hammami et al. [2006] for
the country level, and Albalate et al. [2012] for the local government level). We go
4. For example, the Financial Times reported that in 2002, Goldman Sachs helped Greece
raise its o  balance sheet finance “by arranging a massive swaps transaction aimed at reduc-
ing the cost of financing.” The press report explained: Because it was treated as a currency
trade rather than a loan, it helped Greece to meet European Union deficit limits while pushing
repayments far into the future (Financial Times, Athenian arrangers, February 17, 2010, p7).
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further in explaining the rationale behind the choice of this organizational form
when governments are budget constrained.
Using data from France, we first empirically test if local governments are
more likely to use PPPs under budget constraints. Exploiting a feature of French
institutional context, where it has been mandatory for local PPP to be accounted
for on the public account since January 1st, 2011, we are then able to identify if
this behavior occurs due to a fiscal circumventing motivation, i.e. debt hiding.
As a conclusion, we find that strict budget constraints are associated with a
more frequent tendency to invest through a PPP. However, while the new rule
negatively impacts the use of PPPs, the e ect of budget constraints persists,
especially when financial costs are considered. We then conclude that the adoption
of PPPs is driven by restrictions on financial resources, not merely for debt hiding
motivations.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, our research question
sits at the cornerstone of both the Public Administration Management (hereafter
PAM) and Public Financial Management (hereafter PFM) fields. While PAM
scholars often focus on the activities and managerial practices of public adminis-
trators (Svara [2001]), PFM research is well suited to address the e ects of complex
technical activity on these practices (Kioko et al. [2011]). Our paper follows the
same approach in the sense of studying the impact of governments’ financial situ-
ations on their organizational choices. Despite its relevance in the PFM field, this
topic is rarely recognized in the PAM mainstream (Kioko et al. [2011]) 5. Second,
we are the first to study the adoption of PPPs according to its specific decision
making structure, i.e., French municipalities. We benefit from the fact that we
obtained data on all PPP projects adopted by local governments and that we are
able to make a comparison between a suitable group of municipalities out of all
36,000 French municipalities. Finally, we are the first to shed light on the reason
behind the choice of PPP under budget constraints. This is a crucial point as
it has been contested by both academics and practitioners. Our conclusion can
therefore provide better understanding of PPP adoption from both a theoretical
and practical standpoint.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature
and derives testable hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the French institutional con-
text and legal environment regulating PPPs. Section 4 presents a description of
the data and our empirical approach. Section 5 reports the analysis result and
robustness checks. Section 6 discusses several main results. Finally, Section 7
concludes.
5. Some noteworthy exceptions of PFM studies that are relevant in the PAM field are Hou
[2006], Hou and Moynihan [2008], Krause and Douglas [2005], Thompson and Gates [2007].
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2 Related literature and Hypothesis development
2.1 Financial constraints and PPP
The first objective of the present study is to determine whether public man-
agers choose PPPs as an organizational choice when they are financially con-
strained. This question is therefore not limited to the “make or buy” strategy
but also the strategy of “how to buy”. Indeed, the choice of each available orga-
nizational form has to be explained: why is this particular mode of transacting
preferred over others? In our case, the most frequently considered alternative
strategy to PPPs is the simple contract model, i.e., traditional procurement. As
such, the question is more specifically why PPPs would be preferred over tradi-
tional public procurement methods.
This question of organizational strategy represents the choice between hy-
brid organizational forms (PPP) and the market model (traditional procurement).
This aspect has been largely studied by transaction cost theory scholars (hereafter
TCT). In this stream of literature, managers are believed to always select the
lowest-cost transaction structures that e ectively protect firms against partner
opportunism ,i.e., “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson [1985]), ensure
that partners fulfill contractual obligations, and provide a framework for dealing
with uncertainties (Williamson [1996], Williamson [1991]). Under a hybrid model,
the legal ramifications and coordination complexities are considered to typically
involve higher costs than those of simple contracts (Hennart [1993], Kogut [1991],
Murray and Siehl [1989]). However, that simple contracts might become inade-
quate for certain types of transactions for several reasons: first, partner oppor-
tunism is often di cult to detect; second, firms invest in specific assets; and third,
product attributes or performance objectives cannot be precisely specified ex ante
(Heide and John [1988], Williamson [1975]). As a consequence, a hybrid model
might be an e cient means to reduce these governance problems. Economic ef-
ficiency implies that if the hybrid format is chosen, its benefits are judged to
outweigh their higher costs (Hennart [1993], Kogut [1991]).
In the same line, and more relevant to our topic, scholars from the economics
field argue that PPPs may be preferable to traditional procurement even when
governments are credit constrained (see Engel et al. [2013], Auriol and Picard
[2013], Buso and Greco [2014]). These studies focus on analyzing how the costs
imposed on taxpayers to collect funds for financing an investment, i.e., distor-
tionary taxation, can a ect the choice between PPPs and traditional procurement.
According to Engel et al. [2013], the presence of a shadow cost of public funds
(lower governmental spending capacity) is not a su cient argument for preferring
PPP in a multiperiod context unless governments are hit by liquidity constraints.
Conversely, Auriol and Picard [2013] find that shadow costs become relevant when
comparing the public regime with PPPs 6 for the realization and operation of a
public facility 7. Their paper examines a di erent context than that explored in
6. More precisely, they studied Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts. In this type of
PPP, the private partner is in charge of construction, operation, and financing tasks.
7. This type of organizational form excludes the financing task.
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Engel et al. [2013]. Indeed, their model assumes that the private actor is allowed
to operate under a laissez-faire regime. Furthermore, under the PPP solution,
the private actor is the project manager. Therefore, information asymmetries
are much weaker compared to those in traditional procurement, where the public
actor is the project manager. Despite following a di erent approach, Buso and
Greco [2014] reach a similar result. Their theoretical model is also built under
the context of asymmetric information but the level of public service provision
is set by the government both under PPP and traditional procurement. Within
this framework, savings on distortionary costs under PPP come from the implicit
incentive of the private actor due to his long-term involvement in the project.
On the empirical side, evidence is found for the impact of fiscal restrictions
on the choice of PPPs. At the local government level, Russo and Zampino [2010]
correlate PPP investment and municipal budget data in the Italian context. They
show a strong positive relationship between local public debt and the number of
PPP projects. Deficit, in contrast, is not statistically related to PPP choice.
Similarly, Albalate et al. [2012] find a positive impact of debt level on the level
of private involvement in public projects in the US. However, their results show a
negative impact from tax revenue. They argue that states with higher revenues
are likely to be less reliant on private investment. Hence self-finance capacities
seem to have the opposite e ect of debt. In the same context as ours, Klien
and Tran [2014] also find that French municipalities’ debt and deficit levels are
positively associated with the use of PPP.
We then develop our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: When governments are financially constrained, public managers
are more likely to use PPP than traditional procurement to realize public infras-
tructure.
2.2 PPP under Financial Restraints: Fiscal Circumven-
tion Motivations
In the private sector, earnings management practices, i.e., a collection of man-
agerial decisions that results in not reporting true short-term, value-maximizing
earnings as known to management, have been widely studied (Ronen and Yaari
[2008]). Firms operating under financial constraints are found to be more likely
to distort their reported financial performance. Motivations behind this strategy
might be to raise capital, attract external financing, or improve investment e -
ciency (Linck et al. [2013], Dechow et al. [1996], Dechow et al. [2011], Jackson
et al. [2009], Teoh et al. [1998]). In a di erent vein, other studies argue that
private managers have self-interested motivations to use this accounting strategy
(see Fudenberg and Tirole [1995], Adams et al. [2008] for theoretical perspec-
tives on this issue). Many empirical studies have also found evidence regarding
managers’ motivation to boost their own compensation (Burns and Kedia [2006],
Bergstresser and Philippon [2006], Efendi et al. [2007], Cornett et al. [2008]) or
to address to their career concerns (DeFond and Park [1997]).
In the public sector, governments are also found to react to financial con-
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straints. The public finance literature focuses on this topic in a general way and
stresses that public actors have an incentive to shift debt o  the public budget,
potentially to meet fiscal constraints or to gain voter support. Originally, East-
erly [1999]’s theoretical model claims that constraints on conventional measures
of budget deficits or public debt will only induce an illusionary fiscal adjustment
since government will prevent changes to its net worth. The argument states
that governments seek to maintain current spending levels while reducing explicit
debt and deficits, by “(1) cutting public investment, (2) privatization, (3) shift-
ing revenue and expenditure over time, or (4) running implicit liabilities.” Buti
et al. [2007] found a positive correlation between deficits/debts and the recourse to
stock-flow adjustment, i.e., hiding deficits or selling assets. They claimed that the
adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact seemed to be associated with a greater
use of fiscal gimmicks. Taking a broader approach, Milesi-Ferretti [2004]’s theo-
retical model showed that under strong fiscal rules, creative accounting appears.
Following this model, Von Hagen and Wol  [2006] provided empirical evidence
regarding government use of creative accounting to circumvent fiscal rules. Ac-
cording to their findings, the 1997 introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact
in the European Union resulted in the use of creative accounting. More precisely,
in order to hide deficits, governments used stock-flow adjustment such as annual
changes in the debt level less annual budget deficits. As a result, in reality, the
debt level should have been higher than o cial deficits suggest. Finally, with a
similar objective, Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama [2006] took a di erent approach
and analyzed whether or not the reduction of government debt in the EU is cor-
related with a reduction of government assets in the context of euro adoption.
They found a strong correlation between debt reduction and asset sales as well
as reductions in public investment in the previous year. This result suggests that
“an exclusive focus on deficit and debt levels conveys a misleading picture of the
evolution of the underlying fiscal situation.” As a result, in the context of financial
restraints, a public manager may choose a PPP to reduce the o cial municipal
debt burden.
In the same line of thought, scholars of the PFM and public choice fields fo-
cus on the impact of balanced budget requirements on public policy in terms
of financial issues (Hou and Smith [2010]. Among others, Chaney et al. [2003]
conclude that balanced budget requirements reduce pension fund levels as states
draw from these funds to meet balance requirements. Another finding concerns
the debt management behavior of public managers. Indeed, Hou [2013] argues
that under financial constraints, governments might seek to retire debt in boom
years in order to preserve their debt capacity and reduce borrowing costs. How-
ever, they will incur debt in bust years to obtain a lower interest rate. Finally,
opportunistic behavior of public managers is drawn from Rose [2006]. This study
shows that public managers, under strict no deficit carry-over rules, counter pre-
election spending and post-election restraint patterns that characterize political
business cycles.
As a consequence, debt hiding might be a possible motivation to explain the
adoption of PPPs in a budget-constraint context. In isolating specific debt hiding
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motivations, we evaluate their relevance and the extent to which they explain the
financial restraint e ect on the use of PPP.
Hypothesis 2: Without the possibility of debt hiding, the impact of financial
restraints on the use of PPPs should decrease significantly.
3 Institutional details
In this section, we first focus on describing French municipalities’ budget elab-
oration and control processes. Then, we analyze how PPP accounting rules can
lead to debt-hiding behaviors. Finally, we present the French PPP context.
3.1 French municipalities’ budgets
France has 36,000 municipalities, which are called “communes" and repre-
sent the fifth administrative level in France. Each has a mayor and a municipal
council who jointly manage the area’s administration and have exactly the same
powers no matter the commune’s size. In terms of investment, they are in charge
of pre-primary and primary schools, libraries, cultural/sport centers, and urban
equipment. The principle of municipal self-government leaves gives the munici-
pality wide scope to take responsibility for its own investments, organization, and
financing. However, their budgets are constrained as they have to achieve a bal-
anced public account for both investment and operation sections. This balanced
budget requirement contains both political and technical dimensions in the sense
of Hou [2006].
Following the General Code for Local Authorities, 8 municipalities are obliged
to annually specify their balanced budget for the coming year, which should con-
tain a plan for balancing their investment and the operating budgets. Operat-
ing revenue is mainly composed of local taxes and government grants. Operat-
ing expenses are those related to the municipality’s on-going operations: sta 
salaries, infrastructure maintenance costs, expenses related to the municipality
missions, and financial costs of existing debt. Investment revenue comes from
several sources. Operating budget surpluses provide the majority of the invest-
ment budget (42% in 2012). Government transfers and subsidies represent 24%,
duties 10%, and finally, local taxes and loans represent the remaining 24% (OFL
[2013]). Investment expenses cover annual debt service payments as well as new
investments in infrastructure. It is important to emphasize that France has a
“golden rule" regarding the public budget: public authorities can borrow only to
invest and not to fund current operational spending.
As enacted in the Constitution in 2008, public accounts must be balanced as a
multi-annual objective. This objective is controlled by two levels: the Administra-
tive Courts and the Regional Court of Accounts (Chambre régional des Comptes).
The first control includes the Prefect’s supervision over the e ective balance of
8. France’s General Code for Local Authorities (Code général des collectivités territoriales -
CGCT ) includes laws and regulations applied to local authorities’ three main levels: municipal-
ity, department and region.
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municipalities’ accounts, as well as the possibility of the administrative courts
taking action against a mayor’s misuse of power. The second instrument aims at
checking both the ex ante achievement of the balanced budget requirement and
ex post excessive deficits with respect to balanced budget targets (5-10%) 9.
In such a context, heavily indebted municipalities have higher levels of budget
constraints placed upon their ability to achieve their infrastructures investment
strategies (CES [2012]). Public investment levels in France are known to have
dropped in the 1990s due to a hard budget constraint and a high level of public
debt. In fact, existing debt is a burden for municipalities’ operating and in-
vestment budgets: high level of existing debt pushes up both the corresponding
financial costs (which are part of the operating expenses) and the annual debt
service (which are part of the investment expenses). As a consequence, the self-
financing capacity of these municipalities is reduced. In order to achieve the same
level of investment as other municipalities, they can only take larger and more
costly loans from commercial banks.
3.2 PPP and Debt Hiding motivations
As discussed above, given that PPP could be accounted o  balance sheet fol-
lowing the Eurostat decision in 2004, it seemed to o er a possible method to
circumvent budget constraints. The Eurostat rule classifies infrastructure real-
ized through PPP as non-governmental through the “risks and rewards” criterion
(Heald and Georgiou [2011]). Following this guidance, public authorities have
accounted PPPs o  balance sheet when the construction risk and at least one of
either availability or demand risk are transferred to the private operator. In such
a manner, a PPP was accounted based on the logic of accrual accounting: the an-
nual payment related to investment, financial, and operating costs was reflected in
the public account; the remaining debt element was accounted as a multi-annual
plan of payment in an appendix to the balance-sheet. As a consequence, debt
corresponding to a PPP did not appear on the public balance sheet.
This accounting rule might increase incentives in favor of PPP procedures
for other reasons than the to-be-achieved target of value for money. The first
level is the budgetary level. As discussed in Section 3.1, PPPs can enable public
authorities lacking a su cient capital budget to nevertheless achieve their desired
capital investment strategy. In fact, while a traditionally procured capital project
presents a significant immediate hit to a municipality’s capital budget, PPPs will
have a smaller (but much longer lasting) impact. Second, the French target, in
place since 2005 to reduce Public Sector Net Debt from 66% of GDP to under
60%, could provide an incentive to favor PPP over spending funded directly by
government borrowing. This reflects the fact that in the short term, a PPP scheme
would result in reduced government borrowing and therefore a lower level of Public
Sector Net Debt. Third, European level requirements, i.e., the Maastricht Treaty,
obliges member states to avoid excessive budgetary deficits. More precisely, it
states that governments’ annual deficit and debt should not exceed: (a) 3% for
9. 10% for municipalities with a population less than 20,000 citizens, and 5% otherwise
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the ratio of planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product at
market prices, and (b) 60% for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic
product at market prices (OJEU [2004]). These European fiscal rules therefore
motivate the use of investment methods that allow o  balance sheet accounting.
Finally, public managers’ self-interest can not be excluded. Indeed, a mayor might
choose PPPs according to a debt hiding strategy in order to improve the public
account with the objective of gaining voters support.
3.3 PPP in France and the New Accounting Rule
With a long tradition of using private capital in public services, 10, the French
legal system features a wide range of PPPs which can be classified into two
main categories: users-pay contracts and government-pay contracts (see MaPPP
[2013]). The Contrat de partenariat, the most used of all the government-pay
contracts, is one of the main drivers of the current PPP trend in France (EPEC
[2012]). This form of PPP entails the bundling mechanism (in the sense of Hart
[2003b]) and is the equivalent of the Private Finance Initiative created in 1992 in
the UK.
French public authorities have to follow three steps for implementing a PPP.
The first one is to conduct an évaluation préalable (hereafter “assessment study" or
“preliminary assessment"). In this step, the public authority carries out an anal-
ysis (typically through a consultancy agency) to compare the PPP organizational
form with alternative solutions regarding a project’s global cost, performance as-
pects and risk sharing matters. In these preliminary assessments, the most used
alternative solution is the traditional public procurement. This assessment of a
central government project is then verified by theMission d’appui aux partenariats
public privé (hereafter MaPPP). This organization is the French PPP taskforce
located in the Ministry of Economies and Finance. However, since its creation
in 2004, the MaPPP department has produced appraisal reports for 163 local
PPP projects. The second step is the procurement phase, where the competitive
dialogue is the most-used awarding procedure. This step takes on average 15
months, after which comes the last step, where the preferred bidder is selected
and the contract is signed (see EPEC [2012]).
At the end of 2010, the French Government introduced a Decree on the topic
of PPP accounting rules. This Decree requires PPP projects at the local level to
no longer be recognized o  the balance sheet, and applies to both existing and
new projects. Two reasons motivated this clarification of PPP accounting. First,
it reflects a desire to follow the UK experience in PPP, which is the most advanced
in the world. Indeed, in 2011, the UK Government committed to providing more
transparency to PPP accounting. The O ce for Budget Responsibility decided to
include an assessment of the impact of PPP liabilities in their fiscal sustainability
report, a break with previous years’ National Accounts (Parliament [2011]). Sec-
10. One of the first still existant PPP (a ermage) was created at the XIIth century (Carpentier
et al. [1987]). Moreover, the construction of the Ei el tower in 1887 can be considered the first
concession (Perrot and Chatelus [2000])
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ond, the application of the International Financial Reporting Standards (hereafter
IFRS) implied a switch from the previously used “risks and rewards” criterion to
the control criteria for PPP accounting. More precisely, under a PPP, if the public
authority controls one of the following five aspects of the project, the correspond-
ing debt should be accounted on balance sheet: (a) the private operator is not able
to sell or take out a loan on the equipment, (b) the occupation of a public-owned
domain, (c) the definition of the equipment’s main features, (d) public services’
management, (e) the revenue paid to the private operator for his service. This
new rule has led to on balance sheet recognition of the asset and corresponding
debt upon the infrastructure’s delivery. In other words, the balance sheet records
the investment’s capital value as an asset, while the already-paid investment and
remaining debt are recorded as liabilities. For both these reasons, we can argue
that the rule is not a ected by PPP’s supporters or detractors.
4 Data and empirical strategy
4.1 Data
4.1.1 Treated group: PPP Dataset
In the present study, we exploit the application of the 2011 Decree to isolate
the possibility of debt hiding in order to answer to our research question. Indeed,
the new regulation’s implementation ensures a greater transparency regarding
the governmental body’s real financial situation and might therefore significantly
reduce the temptation to choose PPPs to hide debt (Dupas et al. [2012]). To test
our hypothesis, we choose to focus our analysis on the municipal level instead
of including the two other levels of public administration, i.e., department and
region. This choice allows us to study comparable public entities that have the
same power of decision-making regarding public investment. Moreover, all studied
dimensions are also equivalent among them.
Our principal dataset is comprises the totality of 101 PPP projects enacted
at the municipal level. These projects were concluded between 2004 and Au-
gust 2013 by 95 municipalities and inter-municipalities. 11 In order to preserve
the comparability of the 101 observations, we choose the biggest municipality of
the inter-municipalities as the public actor. We collaborate with the MaPPP de-
partment to collect the main project characteristics such as the concerned public
entity, year of signature, type of project, and its capital value.
Figures 1 and 2 describe PPP trends at the French municipal level since 2005.
The number of PPPs has remained stable from 2007 to 2010, then increased
considerably since 2011, before finally slowing down in 2013. Regarding the cu-
mulative amount of projects, i.e., the value of the projects’ capital investment,
it increased through 2008, then dropped in 2009, rose again in 2010, and finally
fell in 2012. Although we observe a slow recovery in 2013, the reduced number
11. The other two levels of public administration have concluded 37 PPP projects.
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Figure 1: PPP trend in France: Number of projects at the municipal level
Figure 2: PPP trend in France: Cumulative amount of projects at the municipal
level
12
of assessment studies suggests that the number of PPPs will not rebound to pre-
2011 levels in the near future (Klien and Tran (2014)). We also note that our
sample includes 55 PPP projects before 2011 and 56 after 2011. Therefore, the
two groups are equivalent in terms of number for a comparison of the e ect of the
2011 Decree.
4.1.2 Control group: Matching Strategy
To analyze the reasons behind the choice of PPPs in France under a budget
constraint context, we utilize a matching strategy to select a control group that
is similar to our treated group in terms of need for public infrastructure. This
need is determined through a dataset describing the characteristics of all 36,000
French municipalities provided by the French National Institute of Statistics and
Economic Studies (INSEE). 12. The use of a matching strategy particularly fits our
need. Indeed, this choice-based sampling design is frequently chosen in evaluation
studies to reduce costs of data collection in situations where the potential control
population is much larger than the treatment sample (Rosenbaum and Rubin
[1985], Rubin and Thomas [2000], Heckman and Todd [2009]).
We first estimate the propensity score using a logistic regression and a nearest
neighbor estimation. The dependent variable is a dummy describing whether or
not a municipality has undertaken a PPP investment. The covariates represent
municipalities’ need for infrastructure. We not only follow Bahl and Duncombe
[1993] in using municipality population and the income level to measure pub-
lic investment demand but also include other variables covering the years 2009,
2010, and 2011: population, area, number of households, total income, total tax
revenues, number of workers, number of unemployed people, population age distri-
bution, number of firms in di erent sectors, number of public firms, and number
of small and medium enterprises. Second, we choose the two nearest neighbor
observations in terms of propensity score for each municipality in our treatment
group. We thus finally obtain a sample of 303 municipalities, with 101 included
in the PPP group (hereafter “treated group”) and 202 in the group without PPP
(hereafter “control” group). We report the similarities of our two groups during
the study period in Tables 2 and 3.
4.1.3 Financial and Political Datasets
In order to analyze our research questions, we collected financial data for the
period between 2004 and 2012 for virtually all French municipalities from the
website of the Ministry of Economy and Finances. 13 This dataset records the
general financial information on each municipality’s yearly accounting statement
of such as investments and expenses, as well as the revenue structure including
12. This dataset is available on the INSEE website.
13. These financial informationare available on the website www.colloc.bercy.gouv.fr. We
collect this information through the Python program. The dataset is therefore available from
the authors upon request.
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deficits and public debt. In this dataset, municipalities are organized in 30 “ref-
erence groups” classified by population size, participation in public establishment
of inter-municipal cooperation, and any additional tax systems adopted by the
inter-municipal institution. For each reference group, the average value of each
financial dimension is provided. Therefore, in our analysis, we are able to con-
sider the di erence of each financial variable for each municipality from those of
its reference group. Accordingly, we are therefore able to compare municipalities
to others within the reference group as well as compare each to the reference
group over time. We also consider the gross value of each financial dimension as
a robustness check and find that results do not di er. For the remainder of the
paper, we therefore only mention the di erence in value between municipalities’
financial dimensions.
Two other datasets are used to capture political and managerial dimensions.
The first one comes from the Center of Socio-Political Data at the Paris Institute of
Political Studies (Sciences Po). This dataset contains the main information about
municipal elections, for example the mayor’s political party. We complement this
by adding information on the mayor’s personal characteristics taken from the
National Repertory of Politicians dataset of the Ministry of Interior. 14
4.1.4 Final Panel Dataset
Table 1: Panel Dataset Description
Treated Control
101 obs 202 obs
PPP ≠ amount 32,3 0
Annual ≠ Investment 26,2 29,9
Operation≠ result 4,8 5,5
Overall ≠ result 4,7 5,9
Debt 63,6 45,2
Annual ≠ debt≠ payment 9,3 5,6
Subsidies 24,4 21,6
Reported value is the means in million euro over the period 2003 - 2012
Finally, we obtain a panel dataset allowing us to compute the e ect of a
municipality’s financial constraint on the use of PPPs instead of alternative orga-
nizational forms. Table 1 gives the main financial characteristics of our treated
and control groups. The reported values are the means over the period 2003 -
2012. As the treated group is composed of 101 municipalities having concluded
PPPs, the level of investment made under PPPs is on average 32.3 million euro.
This value is logically 0 for the control group, i.e., the group without PPPs. In
14. These two datasets are available from these organizations upon request.
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general, we observe a better financial situation for the control group. Indeed, this
group has a higher positive level of results in both the operation section of the
budget, i.e., operation≠ result (5.5 million euro versus 4.8 million euro) and the
overall budget result, i.e., overall ≠ result (5.9 million euro versus 4.7 million
euro). At the same time, the control group has lower subsidies from the central
government helping the operation section (21.6 million euro versus 24.4 million
euro). Moreover, while the control group annually invests more (29.9 million euro
versus 26.2 million euro), they have lower debt levels, both in terms of stock of debt
(45.2 million euro versus 63.6 million euro) and in terms of annual debt payment
(5.6 million euro versus 9.3 million euro). These figures therefore show that the
control group has a better self-financing capacity than the treatment group. The
level of annual investment of these two groups also shows that municipalities in
the control group have their own investment strategies but did not choose PPPs
as their organizational form.
4.2 Description of variables
As we use a panel database covering the period 2003 to 2013, all variables are
defined for each municipality i and each year t. The variables’ descriptions with
the expected signs are reported in Table 4.
4.2.1 Time variables
As previously discussed, we are interested in explaining the use of PPPs by
French municipalities. We introduce our dependent variable which represents
municipalities that made PPP as an organizational choice. If municipality i in
year t has implemented a PPP, then pppit equals to one in t and until the end of
the period, i.e., 2013; and equals zero for the entire period before year t 15.
4.2.2 Explanatory variables
As there is no universally accepted measure of financially constrained firms
(Linck et al. [2013]), even less for the public sector and municipality financial
situation, we consider three measures for our explanatory variables. To avoid
endogeneity issues, these variables are lagged by one year. We follow Bahl and
Duncombe [1993] in using both stock and flow measures for debt burden. The
stock variable, debtit≠1, captures the municipality’s ex ante exogenous situation.
We then use two flow variables to measure how a municipality’s conditions change
during the period preceding the investment start: annual≠ paymentit≠1 captures
annual debt expenses (interest and capital reimbursement), and self≠financeit≠1
captures a municipality’s self-financing capacity (the surplus from the operating
budget that can be used to finance new investment). 16
15. This type of variable is the instrument used to perform the duration analysis presented in
the Section 4.3
16. The notation of financial agencies such as Moody’s would be a good measure for a mu-
nicipality’s financial situation. However, this notation is currently not available for all French
15
Debt hiding reasons for engaging in PPPs in France were ruled out in 2011.
We account for this legal discontinuity by introducing the variable rulet, which
equals one for periods of time preceding January 1st 2011 and is zero otherwise. 17.
We are interested in the interaction term among rulet and each financial restraint
proxy. These interaction terms show the extent to which the e ect of each proxy
changes after 2011.
Finally, we include the post2011 statistic, which is the sum of the e ects of
each financial proxy and its interaction term with the rule dummy. This coe cient
captures the e ect of each proxy on the use of PPPs after 2011.
4.2.3 Control variables
Given that we have a panel database and are comparing similar municipalities
in terms of population features, we first select those financial covariates that vary
over time and could influence both the dependent variable and financial restraint
proxies. We consider financial variables that reflect municipalities’ capacity to
deal with both the investment’s demand and the balanced budget requirements.
The first variable controls for the balancing of the operating and the investment
budgets as required by the balanced budget specifications. We use budget ≠
resultit≠1, which is the di erence between the operation ≠ resultit≠1 and the
investment spending of municipality i at t ≠ 1. Finally, we consider two other
variables that control for both the size of the investment and the level of the
ex ante available resources: investmentit≠1, which captures the total level of
investment by municipality i at t≠ 1, and subsidiesit≠1 which reflects the level of
national support the municipality received for its investment plans at t≠ 1. 18
We then include three political dimensions that may a ect the selection of
PPP at the municipal level: leftit≠1, centerit≠1, or rightit≠1, which equal one if
the mayor of municipality i is from the left (center or right) wing party at t ≠ 1
and is zero otherwise. This measure is widely used in the PPP literature (see
Klien and Tran [2014] for a review). The variable femaleit≠1 represents the sex
of the mayor and equals one if the mayor of municipality i is female at t≠1 and is
zero otherwise. This measure is also widely used in the management literature to
examine organizational choices (see Klien and Tran [2014] for a review). We also
include the institutional proxy EQI (European Quality of Government Index)
at the regional level (Charron et al. [2014]). This index is the combination of
the level of corruption, protection of the rule of law, government e ectiveness,
and accountability at regional levels in the 27 EU Member States. The measures
are collected in 172 EU regions, based on a survey of 34,000 residents across 18
countries (Charron et al. [2014]). It controls for the municipality’s institutional
aspect.
municipalities.
17. In our regressions, we use the interaction between the dummy rulet and a trend variable
to capture the change in trend on the probability to implement PPP after the application of the
Decree.
18. To prevent collinearity problems, we perform our regressions with each control variable as
a robustness check.
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Finally, we add three main variables used for the matching strategy as control
variables to verify its e ciency: populationit≠1 (the log of the population of each
municipality), incomeit≠1 (the log of the income of each municipality), firmit≠1
(the log of number of firms in each municipality).
4.3 Empirical Strategy
We aim to explore the determinants of a municipality’s decision to use PPP
or wait both before and after 2011, as that year marks the introduction of a new
accounting rule into the legal system.
As some municipalities decide to invest after the creation of a PPP market,
di erent investment times are available over the period 2005-2013. The starting
year is the same for every municipality (2005), but data are incomplete. Mu-
nicipalities that did not invest within the period are necessarily right censoring.
Duration or hazard models are designed to take this issue into account (Hosmer
et al. [1999], Machin et al. [2006], and Chen [2002]).
In duration or survival analyses time is the outcome variable of interest. More
precisely, the dependent variable is defined as survival time because it provides
the interval until a certain event (failure) occurs. The terminology suggests the
main application areas are health and financial economics. However, this approach
can be applied to any type of event that a ects individuals in di erent moments.
Our research question is a suitable application of the duration analysis because
increasing numbers of municipalities used PPPs during the period 2005 - 2013
and we can expect that, in the long run, this technique would become even more
widespread among public operators.
In our case, investment action under a PPP represents the event (failure),
while the survival time is given by the number of years until an investment under
a PPP takes place. In such an analysis, we use the entire database comprising
both our treatment and control groups. Thus, the time is right censoring for all
municipalities that do not experience the event prior to 2013.
The introductory step of the survival analysis consists of computing the Kaplan-
Meier survival curve, S(t), and the Hazard rate function, h(t). The first is com-
puted year by year and reports the proportion of municipalities that survive (do
not use PPP) over time. The second gives the instantaneous potential per unit
time for the event to occur given the survival up to time t.
The next step allows us to assess the relationship between explanatory vari-
ables and survival time. More precisely, it allows us to identify the factors that
determine the probability of implementing a PPP and how the new rule a ected
this propensity to use PPP. We approach the problem through two methods that
aim at computing the hazard rate, that is, the instantaneous event rate.
The first one is a semi-parametric method, the Cox proportional hazard model.
This model makes a major assumption that the hazard rate (instantaneous event
rate) is proportional to the covariates (PH assumption). This means that the
risk of failure (PPP use) is the same no matter how long the municipality has
been followed (Hosmer et al. [1999]). This assumption is plausible for our analysis
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where the probability to invest in PPP should not depend on how much time
has elapsed since 2004, the starting year of our study. However, we perform a
statistical test (stphtest) to assess the PH assumption: we first implement a PH
global test that controls for all covariates simultaneously; then, we graphically
test the PH assumption for the budget constraint regressors. The main regression
for the Cox-Ph model is as follows:
h(t, x,—) = h0(t)f(x, —) (1)
where h0(t) is proportional to the survivor time, while f(x, —) characterizes
how the hazard function changes as a function of our covariates.
The strategy’s second method consists of implementing a full parametric model
where survival time is assumed to follow a known distribution.
We assume the most common Weibull distribution, which is a general distribu-
tion based on two parameters that can be reduced to an exponential distribution
if the hazard is assumed to be constant over time. The hazard rate function that
we are going to estimate through this method is given in the following expression:
h(t, x,—,⁄) = ⁄t
⁄≠1
(e—0+—1x)⁄ (2)
We then run a parametric model for each financial restraint proxy. A graph-
ical method for checking the validity of the Weibull distribution is provided by
examining the Kaplan-Meier log curves against log survival time. The graph in
Figure 3 reports a straight line, thus providing evidence that the distribution of
survival times follows a Weibull distribution.
5 Results and Robustness checks
5.1 Results
We first report the results of the computation of the Kaplan-Meier survival
curve, S(t), and the Hazard rate function, h(t), in Figure 4. The first graph looks
like a step function given the discrete time. Prior to 2005, the survival probability
equals to 1; after this year, some municipalities started to invest. At the end of
the time period, the probability of investment is approximately 30%. This result
reflects the composition of our dataset, which comprises 101 municipalities with
PPP and 202 control municipalities that did not implement any PPP. The Hazard
rate function highlights the increasing conditional likelihood to invest under PPP
up to year 2011. Subsequently, after the application of the new accounting rule,
the line shows a downward trend.
Before presenting the main results of the semi-parametric method under the
Cox proportional hazard model, the global test lets us argue that the PH assump-
tion is not violated in the implemented models. We further control for whether or
not the budget constraint proxies separately respect the PH assumption. Figures
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5, 6, 7 reports the fitted curves. They appear horizontal, which means that the
scaled Schoenfeld residuals are independent with respect to survival time.
Our main results of the Cox proportional hazard model are reported in Table
5. We report both coe cients and hazard ratios in order to obtain a complete
interpretation of our results.
The first set of variables reports the political features of the municipality. The
EQI index (institutional aspect) is positive but not significant. The coe cient
of the dummy female is also positive but also not significant. Finally, among
dummies that reflect the political aspects of municipality governments, only the
dummy right is significant; thus, when the mayor is from the right side of the
political spectrum, the propensity to implement a PPP increases. This result is
in line with previous studies on PPP determinants.
Among variables that control for the financial side, budget ≠ resultit≠1 has
a positive impact, while e ects of investmentit≠1 and subsidiesit≠1 are negative.
Nevertheless, none of the covariates significantly a ect the propensity to invest in
a PPP. In contrast, financial restraints proxies have a significant impact on the
propensity to implement PPPs. First, we observe a positive and significant e ects
for debtit≠1 and annual≠ paymentit≠1 on the use of PPPs, and these persist after
2011. 19 Debt positively impacts the hazard ratio by 18% before 2011 and 14%
after 2011, while the e ect of the annual payment is 31% before the application
of the rule and 26% after the new legislation. While the rule was found to have
a negative e ect, this e ect alone was never significant. As a consequence, we
can conclude that municipalities have not used PPPs to minimize debts, at either
the stock or flow level. Second, for the proxy self ≠ financeit≠1 (which captures
the municipality’s self-financing capacity), the rule’s e ect becomes significantly
positive (a 6.7% increase in the probability that PPPs will be used). This change
may be explained by a shift in French municipalities’ behavior. Before 2011, for
a given level of debt, the availability of resources for further investment did not
a ect the propensity to implement a PPP. After the introduction of the rule,
a municipality showed a higher tendency to use PPPs only when its budget is
balanced, a trait which in itself represents a high self-financing capacity.
Results of the full parametric model where survival time is assumed to follow
a known distribution are substantially equal to the ones of the Cox proportional
Hazard model (Table 6). Indeed, we still found that the levels of debt and annual
payments increase the probability of PPP use. These e ects remain positive and
significant after 2011, while the interaction term is not significant. We also found
a similar result regarding municipalities’ self-financing capacity. The interaction
term rule ≠ self ≠ finance a ects positively the use of PPPs. This highlights
how the presence of internal resources became a significant argument in favor of
PPP investment, essentially after 2011.
19. E ects after 2011 are reported through the post2011 statistic.
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5.2 Robustness checks
We performed various robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of our results.
These are discussed below and results are reported at the end of the paper.
Matching strategy and Time periods issues We have already show how
the treated and control groups are similar not only with respect to the matching
variables, but also by controlling for population characteristics related to the 2000
- 2009 time period. We include, as an additional test, all matching variables in
our duration regressions. Our results are not substantially a ected.
A further source of uncertainty remains in the interpretation of the interac-
tion term between the accounting rule and financial restraint proxy. In fact, the
policy’s impact can be anticipated or identified with hindsight by public actors.
We therefore place the rule at di erent years only found non-significant impacts.
Furthermore, external factors could exist that influence the trend of the budget
constraint proxy but which are also correlated with the PPP dependent variables.
An example would be a financial crisis that could make a PPP investment more
costly for the public buyer, especially when the latter is constrained in terms of
total available resources (Marty and Tran [2014]). This e ect could overemphasize
the rule’s potential impact; therefore we would be potentially overestimating the
extent of debt hiding motivations and underestimating the relevance of alternative
channels.
However, to control for the validity of our strategy, we further apply our du-
ration analyses to the entire population of 36,000 French municipalities using our
matching variables as controls. Results of the level of debt and annual payment for
debt are not substantially a ected, while the e ect of the self-financing capacity
of municipalities became non-significant after 2011 (Table 7).
Panel strategy We propose an alternative empirical strategy in order to check
whether or not our results depend on the adopted specification. We choose to
implement a panel strategy with a nonlinear model, where the dependent variable
is a dummy that equals 1 if municipality i invests under a PPP during year t.
Applying a fixed-e ect estimation with a nonlinear model can be problematic. In
fact, first di erencing or use within a transformation does not permit elimination
of unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, attempts to add municipality or time
dummy variables to the logit or probit estimations will result in biased estimators
due to the incidental parameters problem unless the time period is very large.
A possible solution to this problem may come from using the traditional Ran-
dom E ect Probit. This strategy is appealing, but assumes that the unobserved
components are strictly exogenous and thus independent from our covariates. An
alternative approach would be the Mundlack estimation, which assumes an ex-
plicit function for the latent variable. This method allows correlation between
random e ects and regressors and thus permits the marginal e ects to be calcu-
lated. It can be applied to our full sample and consists of computing a random
e ect logit or probit estimation including the average value over time for each
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of our regressor municipalities. In this paper, we first estimate a simple OLS
regression with clustered standard errors (by municipality). Results are reported
in Table 8 in the Appendix. Subsequently, we implement the Random logit and
the Mundlack Random logit approaches. Results are reported in Tables 9 and
10. 20. Results in Tables 8 and 9 do not substantially change with respect to the
duration analysis. As in the previous regressions, budget constraint e ects are
relevant both before and after the rule’s application. The new accounting law
a ects the impact of the self-financing proxy as well as the relevance of new debt
taken out at time t ≠ 1. When the Mundlack approach is followed (Table 10),
although results for the level of annual payment and self-financing capacity stay
the same, those for debt level become non-significant for the two periods. Debt
level has therefore no impact on the use of PPPs.
Endogeneity problems Finally, we try to eliminate the debt endogeneity prob-
lem by substituting our financial constraints with their values in 2004 (before the
period of interest). Results are reported in Table 11 (duration models). Results are
not substantially a ected apart from the impact of municipalities’ self-financing
capacity, which is negative both before and after 2011.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we found di erent results demonstrating the impact of financial
restraint on the use of PPPs. We also find evidence regarding the persistence of
this impact even when o  balance sheet accounting was no longer possible. As
a consequence, the debt hiding motivation can be considered not relevant when
French mayors make a decision whether or not to use a PPP as an organizational
form for public investments.
However, we find that the Decree shows its e ciency in several ways. First, as
shown by the Hazard rate function, the conditional probability of a municipality
choosing a PPP increased up through 2011. Subsequently, after the application
of the new accounting rule, the line shows a downward trend. Klien and Tran
[2014] found a similar trend after 2011 for PPP projects under the preliminary
assessment phase. We can therefore consider that mayors pay more attention to
the use of PPPs when there is no debt hiding possibility. Second, our results
also show that the rule partially changed the relevance of financial restraint in
explaining the propensity to choose PPPs as an organizational choice. Indeed, the
impact of each municipality’s self-financing capacity shows a change in the reasons
behind that municipality’s investment choice. Before the rule’s application in
2011, the presence of internal resources was not a determinant of PPP investment.
Afterwards, a strict relation between an investment and balanced accounts was
created, making a municipality’s investment decision become directly a ected by
the balanced budget requirements. We can then conclude that even if a PPP’s
accounting advantage is not the only driver of this organizational choice, the 2011
20. Tables report direct marginal e ects.
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Decree helped improving municipalities’ attentiveness regarding their financial
situation before they made an investment decision.
Our main results show that municipalities facing a situation of financial re-
straint choose PPPs for other reasons than the accounting advantage that nor-
mally characterizes this organizational type. Some explanations for our results
can be discussed. The first argument focuses on the financial dimension. Gov-
ernments can face temporary liquidity constraints. In such a case, the upfront
spending required by traditional procurement can become more expensive than
the future transfers required by PPPs because the distortionary cost of taxation is
higher now than in the future (Engel et al. [2013]). This benefit holds unless the
planner can decide to optimally postpone the project (Engel et al. [2013]) or tra-
ditional procurement repayment systems can be delayed by mimicking the timing
allowed under PPPs. 21 Second, from an e ciency point of view, the introduction
of asymmetric information can tilt the choice towards the PPP model over the
traditional procurement by giving relevance to the shadow cost of public funds.
In fact, through PPPs, governments can entrust the project to better-informed
agents (the private operator) and a better controller (the lending bank) (Auriol
and Picard [2013]). Under such an organizational choice, governments can also
save incentive rents thanks to the private agent’s long-term involvement (Buso
and Greco [2014]). Third, as demand factors and institutional constraints are
the main drivers of the debt levels rather than governments’ capacity to finance
(Bahl and Duncombe [1993]), public actors might pay less attention to their debt
burden levels. Moreover, even if we control for some political dimensions, other
political channels may exist that can explain our results. For example, Maskin
and Tirole [2008] find that under a context with high lobbying, it is easier for a
government that uses PPPs to favor some operators. Finally, we can also argue
that even after introduction of the 2011 rule, debt hiding motivations could per-
sist. This explanation should not be particularly relevant given the e ectiveness
of the French Decree in ruling out accounting advantages (see Section 2 which
discusses the French institutional context).
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we first study whether or not a public authority burdened by
a hard budget constraint is more likely to choose PPPs. Second, we examine
the nature of this e ect, i.e., is it made only out of a debt-hiding motivation?
We find that a budget constraint is associated with higher use of PPPs. However,
while the new accounting rule enacted in 2011 might have significantly changed the
temptation for municipalities to hide debt and consequentially decrease the impact
of financial pressure when employing a PPP investment, the budget constraint
e ect continues to be positive and significant for some financial constraint proxies.
We therefore conclude that debt hiding is not the only motivation when financially
21. It is also important to highlight how high levels of public debt do not directly imply
government liquidity constraints.
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stressed municipalities choose PPPs as an organizational form.
Our empirical results contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we
corroborate the traditional view in Public Administration literature. Indeed, as we
do not find evidence for creative accounting adoption when financially constrained
French mayors make their organizational choices, our results support the idea
that public managers’ motivations are to serve the public interest, instigate social
change, and shape policies that a ect society (e.g., Frederickson and Hart [1985],
Perry and Porter [1982], Perry and Wise [1990]). Second, we contribute to the
PFM literature as we found that a large debt burden level is not necessarily
connected with a strategy of o oading debt. This is an interesting result in the
context of a financial crisis, where governments around the world are forced to
cut budgets, restructure service delivery strategies, reset priorities, and assume
enormous new financial responsibilities (Kioko et al. [2011]). Third, we point
out how PFM’s concerns can contribute to PAM core questions such as decision
making, performance management, and organizational strategy. Finally and more
narrowly, we contribute to the existing literature on PPPs. Our results do not
only detect the e ect of budget constraints on the use of PPPs, but also look at
the possible motivations that induce constrained public authorities to choose this
organizational form. This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first direct
empirical analysis of this topic.
From a practical point of view, our paper has also several managerial impli-
cations. First, our results provide more insight to regulation instances such as
the MaPPP. Indeed, the non-relevance of debt hiding motivations is an argument
to continue developing the PPP organizational form. Moreover, the impact of
the 2011 French Decree on more balanced consideration made by public actors
before choosing a PPP may help these instances in improving PPPs’ institutional
framework in the future. Second, our results might also make public actors who
are tempted to use PPPs for financial motivations to reconsider this organiza-
tional choice. Third, our study may help private actors and private lenders in
their deliberations regarding the possibility of collaborating with the public sec-
tor. Indeed, knowing that public managers are not choosing PPPs for debt hiding
motivations may encourage the private sector to financially participate in such
a strategy. Finally, our results have “solved” the myth about PPPs’ motivation
among practitioners. Our results can also partially explain why countries have
increasingly turned to PPPs in recent years despite all these criticisms. In fact, a
2009 OECD report stated that PPPs have grown to comprise a portion, although
not the majority, of capital budgets in several countries. 22. This evolution ex-
perienced a temporary decline during the current economic crisis (EPEC [2012]),
however, the long-term trend is expected to become positive (Wagenvoort et al.
[2010]). Our research addresses a very relevant problem in the current situation
22. The United Kingdom has had the longest experience, with PPPs currently comprising 10%
to 15% of the capital budget in recent years. France and Korea have had similar experience,
with PPPs comprising 20% and 15% of those countries’ capital budgets, respectively. Portugal
reported the highest payments for PPPs, representing nearly 28% of the national budget or 9.4%
of GDP; projects could eventually comprise up to nearly 20% of GDP (Posner et al. [2009])
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where resources are scarce and much creativity is needed to incentivize economic
growth.
24
References
Adams, R., Hermalin, B. E., and Weisbach, M. S. (2008). The role of boards of di-
rectors in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Albalate, D., Bel, G., and Geddes, R. R. (2012). The determinants of contractual
choice for private involvement in infrastructure projects in the United States.
Technical report, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Eco-
nomics.
Auriol, E. and Picard, P. M. (2013). A theory of bot concession contracts. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 89(1):187–209.
Bahl, R. and Duncombe, W. (1993). State and local debt burdens in the 1980s:
A study in contrast. Public Administration Review, pages 31–40.
Bergstresser, D. and Philippon, T. (2006). Ceo incentives and earnings manage-
ment. Journal of Financial Economics, 80(3):511–529.
Bri ault, R. and Fund, T. C. (1996). Balancing acts: the reality behind state
balanced budget requirements. Twentieth Century Fund Press New York.
Burns, N. and Kedia, S. (2006). The impact of performance-based compensation
on misreporting. Journal of financial economics, 79(1):35–67.
Buso, M. and Greco (2014). Public and private finance of PPPs. Mimeo.
Buti, M., Martins, J. N., and Turrini, A. (2007). From deficits to debt and
back: political incentives under numerical fiscal rules. CESifo Economic Studies,
53(1):115–152.
Carpentier, J., Lebrun, F., and Le Go , J. (1987). Histoire de France. Seuil.
CES (2012). L’investissement public : malgré les di cultés, une priorité. Rapport
du Conseiléconomique, social et environnemental.
Chaney, B. A., Copley, P. A., and Stone, M. S. (2003). The e ect of fiscal stress
and balanced budget requirements on the funding and measurement of state
pension obligations. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 21(4):287–313.
Charron, N., Dijkstra, L., and Lapuente, V. (2014). Regional governance matters:
quality of government within european union member states. Regional Studies,
48(1):68–90.
Chen, M.-Y. (2002). Survival duration of plants: Evidence from the us petroleum
refining industry. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(4):517–
555.
25
Cornett, M. M., Marcus, A. J., and Tehranian, H. (2008). Corporate governance
and pay for performance: The impact of earnings management. Journal of
Financial Economics, 87(2):357–373.
Dechow, P. M., Ge, W., Larson, C. R., and Sloan, R. G. (2011). Predicting mate-
rial accounting misstatements. Contemporary accounting research, 28(1):17–82.
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., and Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences
of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions
by the SEC. Contemporary accounting research, 13(1):1–36.
DeFond, M. L. and Park, C. W. (1997). Smoothing income in anticipation of
future earnings. Journal of accounting and economics, 23(2):115–139.
Dupas, N., Gaubert, A., Marty, F., Voisin, A., et al. (2012). Les nouvelles règles
de comptabilisation des partenariats public-privé. Revue Lamy des Collectivités
territoriales, 75(janvier 2012):69–74.
Easterly, W. (1999). When is fiscal adjustment an illusion? Economic Policy,
14(28):55–86.
Efendi, J., Srivastava, A., and Swanson, E. P. (2007). Why do corporate man-
agers misstate financial statements? the role of option compensation and other
factors. Journal of Financial Economics, 85(3):667–708.
Engel, E., Fischer, R., and Galetovic, A. (2013). The basic public finance of
public–private partnerships. Journal of the European Economic Association,
11(1):83–111.
EPEC (2012). France: PPP units and related institutional framework. PPP
Expertise Centre Report.
Frederickson, H. G. and Hart, D. K. (1985). The public service and the patriotism
of benevolence. Public Administration Review, pages 547–553.
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1995). A theory of income and dividend smoothing
based on incumbency rents. Journal of Political Economy, pages 75–93.
Hammami, M., Ruhashyankiko, J.-F., and Yehoue, E. B. (2006). Determinants of
public-private partnerships in infrastructure. International Monetary Fund.
Hart, O. (2003a). Incomplete contracts and public ownership: Remarks,
and an application to public-private partnerships*. The Economic Journal,
113(486):C69–C76.
Hart, O. (2003b). Incomplete contracts and public ownership: Remarks, and an
application to Public Private Partnerships. Economic Journal, 113(485):C69–
C76.
26
Heald, D. and Georgiou, G. (2011). The substance of accounting for public-private
partnerships. Financial Accountability & Management, 27(2):217–247.
Healy, P. M. and Wahlen, J. M. (1999). A review of the earnings management liter-
ature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting horizons, 13(4):365–
383.
Heckman, J. J. and Todd, P. E. (2009). A note on adapting propensity score
matching and selection models to choice based samples. The econometrics jour-
nal, 12(s1):S230–S234.
Heide, J. B. and John, G. (1988). The role of dependence balancing in safeguarding
transaction-specific assets in conventional channels. The Journal of Marketing,
pages 20–35.
Hennart, J.-F. (1993). Explaining the swollen middle: Why most transactions are
a mix of market and hierarchy? Organization Science, 4(4):529–547.
Hodge, G. A. and Greve, C. (2007). Public–private partnerships: an international
performance review. Public administration review, 67(3):545–558.
Hosmer, D., Lemeshow, S., and May, S. (1999). Applied Survival Analysis. Re-
gression Modeling of Time to Event Data. John Wiley&Sons.
Hou, Y. (2006). Budgeting for fiscal stability over the business cycle: A coun-
tercyclical fiscal policy and the multiyear perspective on budgeting. Public
Administration Review, 66(5):730–741.
Hou, Y. (2013). Debt as a countercyclical fiscal tool. In State Government Budget
Stabilization, pages 217–272. Springer.
Hou, Y. and Moynihan, D. P. (2008). The case for countercyclical fiscal capacity.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(1):139–159.
Hou, Y. and Smith, D. L. (2010). Do state balanced budget requirements matter?
testing two explanatory frameworks. Public Choice, 145(1-2):57–79.
Jackson, S. B., Liu, X., and Cecchini, M. (2009). Economic consequences of firms
depreciation method choice: Evidence from capital investments. Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 48(1):54–68.
Kioko, S. N., Marlowe, J., Matkin, D. S., Moody, M., Smith, D. L., and Zhao,
Z. J. (2011). Why public financial management matters. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, 21(suppl 1):i113–i124.
Klien, M. and Tran, P.-T. (2014). Public-private-partnerships in france: Who,
why and why not? Workingpaper.
Kogut, B. (1991). Joint ventures and the option to expand and acquire. Manage-
ment science, 37(1):19–33.
27
Krause, G. A. and Douglas, J. W. (2005). Institutional design versus reputational
e ects on bureaucratic performance: Evidence from us government macroeco-
nomic and fiscal projections. Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory, 15(2):281–306.
Linck, J. S., Netter, J., and Shu, T. (2013). Can managers use discretionary
accruals to ease financial constraints? evidence from discretionary accruals
prior to investment. The Accounting Review, 88(6):2117–2143.
Machin, D., Cheung, Y. B., and Parmar, M. (2006). Survival analysis: a practical
approach. John Wiley & Sons.
Mahoney, J. T., McGahan, A. M., and Pitelis, C. N. (2009). Perspective-the inter-
dependence of private and public interests. Organization Science, 20(6):1034–
1052.
MaPPP (2013). Typologie des PPP. comparaison juridique et terminologique
des PPP dans les conceptions francaise et anglo-saxonne. Mission d’appui aux
partenariats public prive. Document de travail.
Marty, F. and Tran, P.-T. (2014). Public-private-partnerships under financial
crisis: Value for money versus a ordability. Workingpaper.
Maskin, E. and Tirole, J. (2008). Public–private partnerships and government
spending limits. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(2):412–
420.
Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2004). Good, bad or ugly? on the e ects of fiscal rules
with creative accounting. Journal of Public Economics, 88(1):377–394.
Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. and Moriyama, K. (2006). Fiscal adjustment in eu countries:
A balance sheet approach. Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(12):3281–3298.
Murray, A. I. and Siehl, C. (1989). Joint Ventures and Other Alliances: Creating
a Successful Cooperative Linkage. Financial Executives Research Foundation.
NAO (2011). Lessons from PFI and other projects. National Audit O ce - Report
by the controler and auditor general.
Niskanen, W. A. (1975). Bureaucrats and politicians. Journal of law and eco-
nomics, pages 617–643.
OFL (2013). Les finances des collectivités locales en 2013 : Etat des lieux. Rapport
Observatoire des Finances Locales.
OJEU (2004). Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure. Maastricht Treaty-
O cial Journal of the European Union.
Parliament (2011). Private finance initiative. House of Commons Report.
28
Perrot, J.-Y. and Chatelus, G. (2000). Financement des infrastructures et des
services collectifs: Le recours au partenariat public-privé: les enseignements
des expériences françaises dans le monde. Presses des Ponts.
Perry, J. L. and Porter, L. W. (1982). Factors a ecting the context for motivation
in public organizations1. Academy of Management Review, 7(1):89–98.
Perry, J. L. and Rainey, H. G. (1988). The public-private distinction in organiza-
tion theory: A critique and research strategy. Academy of management review,
13(2):182–201.
Perry, J. L. and Wise, L. R. (1990). The motivational bases of public service.
Public administration review, pages 367–373.
Peterson, J. (2003). Changing red to blanc: Deficit closing alchemy. National Tax
Journal.
Posner, P., Ryu, S. K., and Tkachenko, A. (2009). Public-private partnerships:
The relevance of budgeting. OECD Journal on Budgeting, 9(1):11.
PwC (2010). Public-private partnerships: The US perspective. PriceWaterHouse-
Coopers Report.
Rainey, H. G., Backo , R. W., and Levine, C. H. (1976). Comparing public and
private organizations. Public Administration Review, pages 233–244.
Rangan, S., Samii, R., and Van Wassenhove, L. N. (2006). Constructive part-
nerships: When alliances between private firms and public actors can enable
creative strategies. Academy of Management Review, 31(3):738–751.
Ring, P. S. and Perry, J. L. (1985). Strategic management in public and private
organizations: Implications of distinctive contexts and constraints. Academy of
Management Review, 10(2):276–286.
Ronen, J. and Yaari, V. (2008). Earnings management. Springer.
Rose, S. (2006). Do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle? Public choice,
128(3-4):407–431.
Rosenbaum, P. R. and Rubin, D. B. (1985). Constructing a control group using
multivariate matched sampling methods that incorporate the propensity score.
The American Statistician, 39(1):33–38.
Rubin, D. B. and Thomas, N. (2000). Combining propensity score matching
with additional adjustments for prognostic covariates. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 95(450):573–585.
Russo, F. and Zampino, R. (2010). Machiavellian PPP? Evidence from Italian
local government’s projects for public services. In International Public Procure-
ment Conference, Seoul, South Korea, August, pages 26–28.
29
Svara, J. H. (2001). The myth of the dichotomy: Complementarity of politics
and administration in the past and future of public administration. Public
administration review, 61(2):176–183.
Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., and Wong, T. J. (1998). Earnings management and the
long run market performance of initial public o erings. The Journal of Finance,
53(6):1935–1974.
Thompson, F. and Gates, B. L. (2007). Betting on the future with a cloudy crystal
ball? how financial theory can improve revenue forecasting and budgets in the
states. Public Administration Review, 67(5):825–836.
Von Hagen, J. and Wol , G. B. (2006). What do deficits tell us about debt?
Empirical evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the EU. Journal
of Banking & Finance, 30(12):3259–3279.
Wagenvoort, R., De Nicola, C., and Kappeler, A. (2010). Infrastructure finance
in europe: Composition, evolution and crisis impact. EIB papers, 15(1).
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust impli-
cations: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization. Free Press, New
York, NY, USA.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. The Free
Press, New York, NY, USA.
Williamson, O. E. (1991). Comparative economic organization: The analysis of
discrete structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36:269–296.
Williamson, O. E. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, UK.
Zeng, M. and Chen, X.-P. (2003). Achieving cooperation in multiparty alliances: A
social dilemma approach to partnership management. Academy of Management
Review, 28(4):587–605.
30
Table 2: PS Test
Variable Treated    Control %bias   t            p>t
population_2009 35367         25448 12.5 1.35           0.181
population_1999 33663         24598 12.1 1.28           0.202
area 28626         31886 -3.1 -0.47          0.638
population_2009_men 16976         11728 14.2 1.38           0.169
accomodations_2009 19662         14281 12.9 1.25           0.213
main_residences_2009 16976         11728 14.2 1.38           0.169
second_residences_2009 1240.9        1517.9 -7.2 -0.43          0.667
vacant_accomodations_2009 1444.6        1034.6 11.8 1.24           0.217
owned_residences_2009 6965.3        5266.6 10.9 1.24           0.216
income_2009 4.7e+08      3.3e+08 13.0 1.32           0.189
taxpayers_2009 20678         14983 12.2 1.32           0.190
workers_2009 20195         14291 15.8 1.25           0.215
long_term_workers_2009 18327         13000 15.9 1.23           0.222
workers_1999 17857         12670 15.6 1.22           0.223
population_15-64_2009 23938         16610 14.0 1.41           0.159
unemployed_15-64_2009 2419           1658.1 13.3 1.43           0.155
employed_15-64_2009 16637         11732 14.0 1.38           0.169
total_firms_2010 3471.8        2432.9 12.8 1.34           0.181
agriculture_firms_2010 46.94          37.58 15.8 0.93           0.354
industry_firms_2010 155.95        118.12 11.6 1.25           0.214
construction_firms_2010 241.12        194.08 6.6 0.94           0.346
services_firms_2010 2466           1717.9 13.1 1.31           0.192
trade_firms_2010 702.65        536.27 10.7 1.09           0.279
public_firms 561.76        365.2 14.3 1.52           0.131
SMEs 998.84        706.87 13.7 1.34           0.183
No_SMEs 268.11        196.87 14.4 1.19           0.235
31
Table 3: PS Test pre 2009
Variable Treated Control % bias  t          p>t          
taxpayers_08 26544 23728 3.3 0.24        0.808
net_income_08 5.8e+08 6.4e+08 -2.3 -0.16      0.874
total_tax_08 3.4e+07 5.5e+07 -6.1 -0.42      0.673
taxable_income_08 4.7e+08 5.5e+08 -3.2 -0.23      0.821
notaxable_income_08 1.1e+08 9.2e+07 6.6 0.51       0.611
taxpayers_07 26398 23598 3.3 0.24       0.808
net_income_07 5.7e+08 6.3e+08 -2.4 -0.17      0.867
total_tax_07 3.7e+07 5.9e+07 -6.0 -0.42      0.678
taxable_income_07 4.6e+08 5.5e+08 -3.3 -0.23      0.818
notaxable_income_07 1.0e+08 8.5e+07 7.0 0.54       0.591
taxpayers_06 26198 23445 3.3 0.24       0.810
net_income_06 5.4e+08 6.0e+08 -2.3 -0.16      0.873
total_tax_06 3.5e+07 5.5e+07 -6.0 -0.41      0.680
taxable_income_06 4.4e+08 5.2e+08 -3.2 -0.23      0.821
notaxable_income_06 1.0e+08 8.6e+07 6.7 0.51       0.610
taxpayers_05 25780 23239 3.0 0.22       0.823
net_income_05 4.2e+08 4.7e+08 -2.4 -0.17      0.864
taxpayers_04 25755 23259 3.0 0.22       0.827
net_income_04 4.1e+08 4.6e+08 -2.6 -0.18      0.856
taxpayers_03 25594 23261 2.8 0.20       0.839
net_income_03 4.0e+08 4.5e+08 -2.6 -0.18      0.854
taxpayers_02 25277 23001 2.7 0.20       0.841
net_income_02 3.8e+08 4.3e+08 -2.6 -0.18      0.855
taxpayers_01 24883 22830 2.5 0.18       0.855
net_income_01 3.6e+08 4.2e+08 -3.1 -0.22      0.826
taxpayers_00 24514 22288 2.8 0.20       0.840
net_income_00 3.5e+08 4.1e+08 -3.0 -0.21      0.833
taxpayers_99 24184 22021 2.7 0.20       0.843
net_income_99 3.4e+08 3.9e+08 -3.0 -0.21      0.834
taxpayers_98 23890 21870 2.6 0.19       0.852
net_income_98 2.1e+09 2.4e+09 -2.8 -0.19      0.846
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Figure 3: Kaplan - Meier Survival Estimate
Figure 4: Survival and Hazard Rate Curves
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Figure 5: PH Tests for Financial constraints covariates: Debt and Rule*Debt
Figure 6: PH Tests for Financial constraints covariates: Annual_payment and
Rule*Annual_payment
Figure 7: PH Tests for Financial constraints covariates: Self_finance and
Rule*Self_finance
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Table 8: OLS cluster estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment
EQI 0.0816 0.0834 0.0532 0.0578 0.0370 0.0315
(0.26) (0.26) (0.17) (0.18) (0.12) (0.10)
female 0.000359 0.000932 -0.00538 -0.00491 -0.0146 -0.0238
(0.00) (0.00) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.05) (-0.08)
left -0.0447 -0.0446 -0.0593 -0.0568 -0.0400 -0.0301
(-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.27) (-0.26) (-0.18) (-0.14)
center -0.586 -0.581 -0.618 -0.612 -0.623 -0.637
(-0.55) (-0.54) (-0.59) (-0.59) (-0.57) (-0.59)
right 0.540** 0.531** 0.503** 0.495** 0.546** 0.540**
(2.31) (2.26) (2.15) (2.11) (2.31) (2.27)
budget_result -0.0187 -0.0187 -0.0198 -0.0198 -0.0266 -0.0275
(-0.94) (-0.95) (-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.27) (-1.33)
grant 0.000113 -0.000348 0.00142 0.000902 0.00161 0.00457
(0.00) (-0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10)
investment -0.0617 -0.0608 -0.0949** -0.0920** -0.0742* -0.0810*
(-1.37) (-1.36) (-2.09) (-2.05) (-1.65) (-1.74)
trend_rule -0.959** -0.958** -0.970** -0.970** -0.960** -0.958**
(-2.29) (-2.29) (-2.31) (-2.31) (-2.30) (-2.29)
debt 0.136*** 0.172** 0.142*** 0.145***
(3.32) (2.36) (3.39) (3.35)
rule_debt -0.0539
(-0.78)
annual-payment 0.242*** 0.282***
(3.96) (3.03)
rule_annual-payment -0.0649
(-0.79)
self-finance 0.0216 -0.00524
(1.24) (-0.22)
rule_self-finance 0.0679*
(1.96)
_cons 9.129* 9.214* 9.328* 9.408* 9.883* 9.813*
(1.72) (1.74) (1.74) (1.76) (1.84) (1.83)
N 2658 2658 2658 2658 2658 2658
post2011 0.118*** 0.217*** 0.0627**
t 2.862 3.559 2.399
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
In these regressions are included as covariates: population, income, n. of firm and year dummies
All budget covariates are computed as di erence with the reference group.
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Table 9: Random Logit Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment
EQI 0.0816 0.0834 0.0532 0.0578 0.0370 0.0315
(0.20) (0.20) (0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08)
female 0.000352 0.000924 -0.00539 -0.00491 -0.0146 -0.0238
(0.00) (0.00) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.04) (-0.06)
left -0.0447 -0.0446 -0.0593 -0.0568 -0.0400 -0.0301
(-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.23) (-0.22) (-0.15) (-0.12)
center -0.586 -0.581 -0.618 -0.612 -0.623 -0.637
(-0.55) (-0.55) (-0.58) (-0.58) (-0.59) (-0.60)
right 0.540** 0.531* 0.503* 0.495* 0.546** 0.540*
(1.97) (1.93) (1.83) (1.80) (1.98) (1.96)
budget_result -0.0187 -0.0187 -0.0198 -0.0198 -0.0266 -0.0275
(-0.97) (-0.97) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.30) (-1.34)
grant 0.000113 -0.000349 0.00142 0.000902 0.00161 0.00457
(0.00) (-0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.10)
investment -0.0617 -0.0608 -0.0949 -0.0920 -0.0742 -0.0810
(-1.01) (-0.99) (-1.50) (-1.44) (-1.21) (-1.30)
trend_rule -0.959** -0.958** -0.970** -0.970** -0.960** -0.958**
(-2.36) (-2.36) (-2.39) (-2.39) (-2.36) (-2.35)
debt 0.136** 0.172** 0.142** 0.145**
(2.42) (2.39) (2.53) (2.55)
rule_debt -0.0539
(-0.93)
annual-payment 0.242*** 0.282***
(2.88) (2.88)
rule_annual-payment -0.0649
(-0.92)
self-finance 0.0216 -0.00524
(1.12) (-0.23)
rule_self-finance 0.0679*
(1.88)
_cons 9.129 9.214* 9.328* 9.408* 9.883* 9.813*
(1.64) (1.65) (1.66) (1.67) (1.77) (1.75)
N 2953 2953 2953 2953 2953 2953
post2011 0.118** 0.217** 0.0627**
t 2.032 2.500 2.016
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
In these regressions are included as covariates: population, income, n. of firm and year dummies
All budget covariates are computed as di erence with the reference group.
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Table 10: Chamberlain’s Random Logit Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment
EQI -0.0749 -0.0706 0.0358 0.0439 0.0584 0.0290
(-0.19) (-0.18) (0.09) (0.11) (0.15) (0.07)
female 0.131 0.136 0.0337 0.0391 -0.0541 -0.0344
(0.33) (0.34) (0.08) (0.10) (-0.14) (-0.09)
left -0.294 -0.285 -0.274 -0.277 0.0293 0.0178
(-1.09) (-1.06) (-1.00) (-1.01) (0.11) (0.07)
center -0.122 -0.0974 -0.221 -0.228 -0.673 -0.623
(-0.11) (-0.08) (-0.19) (-0.20) (-0.63) (-0.58)
right 0.531* 0.527* 0.422 0.407 0.569** 0.552**
(1.82) (1.81) (1.40) (1.34) (2.05) (1.98)
budget_result -0.0112 -0.0112 -0.0108 -0.0110 -0.0206 -0.0212
(-0.50) (-0.50) (-0.48) (-0.49) (-0.97) (-0.99)
grant 0.0105 0.0112 0.00121 0.00173 -0.00977 -0.000356
(0.19) (0.21) (0.02) (0.03) (-0.20) (-0.01)
investment -0.0436 -0.0471 -0.0731 -0.0751 -0.0255 -0.0301
(-0.58) (-0.62) (-0.90) (-0.92) (-0.36) (-0.42)
trend_rule 0.759 0.733 0.769 0.754 -0.955** -0.959**
(1.47) (1.42) (1.48) (1.45) (-2.34) (-2.34)
debt 0.120 0.170 0.0998 0.106
(1.34) (1.53) (1.34) (1.09)
rule_debt -0.108
(-0.79)
annual-payment 0.308*** 0.315**
(2.66) (2.48)
rule_annual-payment -0.00710
(-0.09)
self-finance 0.0400* -0.00641
(1.76) (-0.23)
rule_self-finance 0.111**
(2.45)
_cons -6.798 -6.698 -7.096 -7.175 6.717 5.960
(-1.35) (-1.33) (-1.37) (-1.37) (1.54) (1.35)
N 2103 2103 2103 2103 2953 2953
post2011 0.0622 0.308** 0.104***
t 0.571 2.569 2.797
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
In these regressions are included as covariates: population, income, n. of firm and year dummies
All budget covariates are computed as di erence with the reference group.
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